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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
FRANK BAINE,
Appellant, )

''

GEORGE BECKSTEAD, Sheriff,
Respondent.

Case No.
9049

)

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT
On March 14, 1958, appellant was convicted on a cheek
charge in the District Court of Salt Lake County and sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison, but placed on
probation under the supervision of the Adult Parole and
Probation Department during good behavior and commitment stayed during such probation (R-1, 2nd paragraph
and R-4, paragraph 1).
One of the provisions of the probation agreement was
that appellant report to the court in person every 3 months,
which he did (R-9).
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On March 11, 1959, the probation officer filed an affidavit with the court alleging that on or about the 6th day
of :\{arch, 1959, the appellant committed the crime of ru;sault
with a deadly weapon apon one Earlene Kennon, (Exhibit
P-1), and thereupon the court issued an Order requiring
appellant to appear on the 16th day of :March and show
cause (Exhibit P-2).
The hearing on said Order was continue1i to March
25th, at which time said Order to Show cause and affidavit
was dismissed by the Court (R-14).
March 27th being the regular reporting date for appellant under the original sentence and probation agreement,
the appellant reported to the Court at which time, without
notice or an opportunity to be heard and without any
charges being made against him in any form W'llat_qoever,
the Court made and entered the following Order:

"Stay of execution of sentence terminated and
execution to issue in accordance with sentence heretofore imposed. Commitment to issue forthwith.
VanCott, Jr., Judge."
Pursuant to this Order appellant was remanded to the
custody of respondent for commitment to the "Ctah State
Prison whereupon appellant applied for a writ of HabeM
Corpus, (R-1). The writ was issued, (R-3), and upon hearing thereon the writ was dismissed (R-6). From the Order
dismissing the writ, this appeal is prosecuted to this Court
and as grounds for reversal assigns the following errors:
Error of the Court in dismissing the Writ of
Habeas Corpus.
1.
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To sustain this appeal appellant relies on the following:

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.

NO PERSON SHALL BE DEPRIVED OF LIBERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW.

POINT II.

PROBATION MAY NOT BE REVOKED WITHOUT ~OTICE AKD AN OPPORTCNITY TO BE
HEARD.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
NO PERSO~ SHALL BE DEPRIVED OF LIBERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW.
Art. I, Sec. 7, Utah Colli'ltitution,

14th Amendment, U. S. Constitution,

State vs. Bonza, 150 P. 2nd 970.
As applied to the revocation of probation this Court
defined due process with the fo11owing language in State
vs. Bonza.., supra, at page 972 Pacific citation:
"A defendant out of prison on probation is accorded due process of law by the following steps;
(1) The filing of a verified statement or affidavit
in the case setting forth the facts which show a violation of the terms of probation. (2) The issuance
of an Order to Show Cause, etc. (3) A hearing before the court on the question of violation of some
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term or condition of probation and an opportunity
to crossexamine witnesses. (4) A determination of
the question (by the court) followed by the entry
of an appropriate order."
The record now before this Court reveals that not one
of the stepg above Huggested was even attempted to be complied with by the court. Not even the last requirement
which requires that the court make a finding that the terms
or conditions of the probation agreement had been violakd.
Further argument on this point would be a reflection on the
intelligence of this Court.

POINT II.
PROBATION :MAY NOT BE REVOKED WITHOUT NOTICE AND AN OPPORTUNITY TO BE
HEARD.

Ex Parte Pollett, 225 P. 2nd 16,
SWte VS. Hemler, 102 So. 316,

State vs. Zolant-akis, 259 P. 1044,
Demmiek vs. Harris, 155 P. 2nd 170,
State VS. Bcmza, 150 P. 2nd 970,
Chestnut vs. Turner, Case ::-Jo. 120353, Dist. Ct.
Salt Lake County.
The question presented by this appeal is not new to
this Court. It has been before this Court on many occasions
and all of the cases cited herein are Utah cases except the
Hemler case.
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The Hemler case is an early Louisiana case wherein the
defendant had been convicted of being an habitual violator
of the liquor laws of the state, sentenced to the state prison
but placed on probation during good behavior. Subsequent
thereto, the defendant was again arrested for a liquor law
violation and charged there·with in a court of competent
jurisdiction and while said action was pending the probation court revoked his probation and committed defendant
to the State Prison and on appeal, the Supreme Court of
Louisiana said;
"The act of the judge in arresting the defendant
and committing him was premature and unauthorized."
and reversed the commitment.
In the Zolantakis case this Court reviewed the authorities on this subject, including the Herntn· decision, after
which it reached this concluflion;
"The purpose of the law permitting the suspension of sentence is clearly reformatory. If those who
are to be reformed cannot implicitly rely upon promises or orders contained in the suspension of sentence, then we may well expect the law to fail in its
purpose. Reformation cel"tainly can bel!t be accomplished by fair, consistant, and straightforward
treatment of the person sought to be reformed. It
would therefore seem, both upon authority and principal, that when a sentence is suspended during good
behavior, without reservations, the person whose
sentence is thus suspended has a vested right to rely
thereon so long as such condition is complied with.
The right to personal liberty is one of the most sacred and valuable rights of a citizen, and should not
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be regarded lightly. The right to personal liberty
may he as valuable to one convicted of crime as to
one not so convicted, and so long as one complies
with the conditions upon which the right is assured
by judicial declaration, he may not be deprived of
the same. Such right may not be alternatively
granted and denied without just cause."

This decision has been before this Court for review in
all of the other cases cited herein and many more and has
been criticized, even by members of this Court, and the last
expression on the soundness of this decision is found in the
Pollett case wherein it is said:
"If we are correct in our conclusion that a defendant has a ve.sted right to his liberty during good
behavior when so ordered without reservation in
the original sentence, any proceeding failing in these
essentials is error."

After analyzing the problems that may arise in cases
of this type, the Court continued:
"But the question of whether a judge suspending a sentence during good behavior retains un·
bridled power to change his mind on more mature
thought with or without evidence of any conduct
which would warrant such change of mind, may
well await a case where the facts of the Zolantakis
case are repeated before determining whether we
desire to entirely overrule it.
"It is not to be presumed that a judge, having
absolute discretion to grant or deny probation, will
arbitrarily revoke a defendant's probation or refuse
to grant a further stay of execution when he has
abided by the terllll'l of his agreement with the court
and probation department."
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In State VS. Bonw, this Court made the following ruling without criticism.
"Where the commission of a subsequent offense
is made the basis of an application for termination
of probation, and a complaint or information has
been lodged charging probationer with i'tf!. commission, action by the probation court may well abide
the determination of his guilt or innocence in the
court before which the prooecution is conducted."
In most o.:: the cases to reach this Court the revocations
have been upheld on distinguishable factual situations. In
the Demmick case the court granted a stay for the purpose
of allowing the defendant to make cortuin disclosures of
other parties involved in crime. The defendant failed to
make the disclosures and he was committed without a hearing, which this Court upheld. In one case the defendant was
placed on probation and required to report to the court on
a day certain. The defendant failed to report and the court
revoked the probation without a hearing and this Court
held that the burden rested on the defendant to justify his
failure to report. In the Ronza case the defendant \Vas
placed on probation and subsequently was convicted of
petty offenses and on one occasion became involved in a
felony in Tooele County for which he was not prosecuted,
and upon notice and hearing his probation was revoked
and upheld by this Court. We have already pointed out the
distinguishing features of thi;; case, as pointed out by this
Court.
In the case at bar it is admitted that the appellant was
placed on probation during good behavior, (R-1 and 4). An
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affidavit was filed with the court alleging that defendant
had committed a felony by assaulting Earlene Kennon with
a deadly weapon. As het·etofore pointed out, it was made
to appear that there was an action then pending wherein
the appellant was formally charged with said offense, which
action is now still pending, and thereupon the affidavit and
Order to Shew Cause was dismissed.
Afterwards on appellant's regular reporting day, without notice and without any complaint of any kind or nature
whatsoever being made against appellant, and without any
finding of any cause whatsoever, the court summarily revoked probation and ordered appellant committed, and thus
the question posed in the Pollett case is now forthrightly
before this Court for determination, namely:
"But the question of whether a judge suspending a sentence during good behavior retains unbridled power to change his mind on more mature
thought with or without evidence of any conduct
which would warrant such change of mind, may
well await a case where the facts of the Zola.ntaki!J
case are repeated before determining whether we
desire to entirely overrule it."
The Order to Show Cause and Affidavit having been
dismissed, there was nothing before the court upon which
the court could act, except upon his own volition and without cause.
Appellant contends that such action is inconsistent
with our American concept of il1dividual liberty and freedom al< guaranteed by both State and Federal Constitutions.
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For illu,;trative purposes let's assume that Earlene
Kennon had appellant hemmed in a corner with a meat
knife at his throat threatening to cut his head off and appellant had no other apparent means of escape, and therefore, struck her in the face with his fist, knocking her down
and then jumped over her prostrate body and fled. Upon
regaining consciousness Earlene called police and lodged
this complaint against appellant. Can it be said that because appellant was on probation he had no right to defend
himself with reasonable force? The answer is obviously
no. Had appellant been given a chance to be heard he may
have been able to completely refute the charge~\ made against
him, and it is the position of appellant that the proper place
for such defense is in the court ·where the charge is pending. See cases herein above cited.

Chestnut vs. Turner is a case decided by the same court,
but by a different judge, on April 23, 1959, wherein it was
determined that Chestnut was held in the state prison by
Turner, as warden, pursuant to a commitment from the
Seventh District. The evidence shows that Chestnut had
been convicted of burglary in the Seventh District and
placed on probation. Subsequent thereto the Distrkt Attorney reported to the Court that Chestnut had committed
another crime by the theft of an automobile and the court
revoked the probation and committed Chestnut without a
hearing. Judge Larson granted the writ and ordered Chestnut discharged. Thus we have the same court making opposite rulings on the same question, which is a very unhealthy atmosphere to impose upon society as a whole. If
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such condition is allowed to exist in Salt Lake County, then
the citizens thereof will be subject to rule by man rather
than rule by law.

CONCLUSION
We have shown herein wherein appellant was deprived
of his liberty without due process of law ag defined by this
court and in violation of both state and federal constitutions. In this we humbly submit that this Court should deny
trial judges the unbridled power to toy with the Jives of men
like a kitten playing with a mouse and reverse the Order
dismis,·,ing the Writ, with costs to appellant.
Respectfully submitted,
D. H. OLIVER,

Attorney for AppeUant.
524 Beason Building,
Salt Lake City, Utah.
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